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Recent Decisions
In summary, it seems that there are compelling reasons for abolish-
ing all forms of privity unconditionally. If a manufacturer makes a
defective product, he should not escape liability simply because the
"proper" relationship is lacking. This would be no burden on the
manufacturer in this age of insurance and general economic affluence,
and it would insure a market filled with merchantable commodities.
Stephen G. Walker
CRIMINAL LAW-ARRESTS-USE OF DEADLY FORCE-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court established a rule that a private person may use deadly
force to effectuate an arrest only when certain enumerated felonies
have been committed, and approved the rule that an arresting party
will always be criminally responsible if deadly force is used against any-
one but an escaping felon.
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968).
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder as a result of a fatal
shooting in front of his home. He testified that on the night in question
he was awakened by a noise at about three a.m. He found a set of doors
to the outside pushed open but still secured by an attached chain.
He then saw an unidentified person run out of an adjacent alleyway,
across a street and to a neighbor's house, where, petitioner said, "he
started fixing around the windows." A car then passed and the uniden-
tified person darted into an alleyway. Later petitioner saw the same
person "monkeying around" windows of another neighbor's house.
Because his own home lacked a telephone, petitioner sent his son to
notify police. He then secured a rifle and stepped outside onto the
doorstep. The unidentified man began to run and petitioner shouted,
"Halt or I'll shoot." The man continued running and petitioner fired
one shot, which was fatal. Petitioner testified that he had fired at a tree.
The instant case marks the first time a Pennsylvania appellate court
has placed a limitation on the felonies for which deadly force may be
used in preventing a fleeing felon's escape. It is also the first ratification
by the Supreme Court of a twenty-three year old Superior Court rule
Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966). No Pennsylvania cases have considered
the exact problem above, but see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS, Explanatory Notes
§ 402A, comment I at 354, illustration 1 at 355 (1965).
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which requires police officers and private citizens to be absolutely posi-
tive that a suspect is a felon before deadly force may be used to prevent
his escape.'
In deciding the instant case, the court noted that a non-officer in
fresh pursuit of one who has committed a felony may arrest without a
warrant,2 and that deadly force may be used if his arrest cannot other-
wise be effected. 3 The court established that the common law rule as
to the use of .deadly force was "manifestly inadequate" for today,4 and
then stated that:
We therefore hold that from this date foreward the use of deadly
foice by a private person in order to prevent the escape of one who
has committed a felony or has joined or assisted in the commission
of a felony is justified only if the felony committed is treason, mur-
der, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common
law rape, common law burglary, kidnapping, assault with intent
to murder, rape or rob, or a felony which normally causes or
threatens death or great bodily harm.5
Secondly, the court stated that besides the commission of an enumer-
ated felony it was "absolutely essential" that the person killed had ac-
tually participated in the felony.6
While there are no prior Pennsylvania cases specifically dealing with
the Chermansky holding quoted above-and none cited by the court
-some authority on the subject existed which the court seemingly
failed to consider. Dean Trickett wrote that "[t] he felony which jus-
tifies the killing of the perpetrator in effecting his arrest may be, not
homicide only, but robbery, burglary, entering a stable with intent to
steal [a] harness, larceny. . . .,,7 This description included statutory
burglary, which was excluded by the instant court's ruling.8 As early
1. Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
2. Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211 (1922); Commonwealth v. Long,
17 Pa. Super. 641 (1901); 2 W. TRICKETT, THE LAW OF CRIMES IN PENNSYLVANIA 683 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as TRICKETr].
3. Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211 (1922); TRICKETT, supra note 2,
at 683.
4. The court noted that the rule developed when virtually all felonies were punish-
able by death and when the distinction between felony and misdemeanor was very
different than it is today.
5. C6mmonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 173-74, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (1968).
6. Id. at 174, 242 A.2d at 240, citing Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484,
45 A.2d 235 (1946).
7. TRICKETT, supra note 2, at 678.
8. 430 Pa. at 173-74, 242 A.2d at 240. Statutory burglary is defined as follows: "Who-
ever, at any time, wilfully and maliciously, enters any building, with intent to commit
any felony therein, is guilty of burglary, a felony. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4901
(1963).
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as 1869 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Brooks v. Common-
wealth9 that either a private person or a police officer could use deadly
force to arrest after "any felony" had been committed, provided he
was present at the commission. In a later Pennsylvania case, Common-
wealth v. Long,'0 where it was established that a homeowner had law-
fully used deadly force against a fleeing common law burglar, there
was no indication that the felony had to be a dangerous one.
Thus, until Chermansky, the Pennsylvania rule appeared to be that
even after the commission of a non-dangerous felony the arresting party
was permitted to use deadly force to effect the capture. It was in line
with the common law rule" stated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.'2
In dealing with the instant court's apparent affirmation of the rule
of Commonwealth v. Duerr,"3 which held police officers and private
persons criminally responsible if the fleeing arrestee who is the subject
of deadly force turns out to be an innocent non-felon, two different
situations should be distinguished: the use of deadly force to prevent
the occurrence of a felony and its use to arrest a fleeing felon once the
crime has been attempted or committed. Here only the latter situation
will be dealt with.
It is also noteworty to state at the outset that an innocent person can
be killed by the mistaken use of deadly force by an officer or private
person in either of two situations. First, the arresting party can be mis-
taken in his belief that a felony was committed, when in fact none was.
And second, he can err in thinking that the person he is attempting to
arrest committed a particular felony, which, while it actually occurred,
was committed by another. Reference will be made to these errors as
the first and second mistake as noted above.
During the early common law (the late 1600s), both officers and
private citizens were allowed to arrest-without the use of deadly force
9. 61 Pa. 352, 358 (1869).
10. 17 Pa. Super. 641 (1901).
11. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 874 (1957) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 (1965) where it is stated as follows:
"The actor's use of force against another, for the purpose of effecting a privileged arrest
of the other, by means intended or likely to cause death, is privileged if . . . the arrest
is made without a warrant for treason or for a felony which has been committed...."
In RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix § 131 (1965), it is reported that the
former rule, which allowed the use of such force to arrest for only those felonies which
caused or threatened death or serious bodily harm, or involved a common law burglary,
had no direct authority to support it.
13. 158 Pa. Super, 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
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-only when a felony had in fact been committed.1 4 In other words, in
making an arrest neither was allowed to make the first mistake. The
official's right, however, was slightly less restrictive.'6 While having a
less reasonable basis for the arrest, the officer could do so without fear
of liability. In fact, in writings dated as late as 1765 no other distinction
was made between private and official persons who arrested when no
felony had been committed-both were responsible for the false
arrest.'6
Between the years 1780 and 1827, a rule known as the "common law
rule" developed.' 7 The rule was stated in 1827 as follows:
There is this distinction between a private individual and a con-
stable: in order to justify the former in causing the imprisonment
of a person, he must not only make out a reasonable ground of
suspicion, but he must prove that a felony has actually been com-
mitted; whereas a constable having reasonable ground to suspect
that a felony has been committed, is authorized to detain the
party suspected until inquiry can be made by the proper author-
ities.1 8
If the lawful arrest could not be made without the use of deadly
force, all citizens at common law were privileged to kill in order to halt
the fleeing felon.' 9 (As is the law in Pennsylvania today, the privilege
arose only when the suspect could not otherwise be taken.)20 There were
no exceptions to this rule which dealt punishment to the fleeing felon.
It was predicated on the common law punishment for all felonies-
death.21 But even this "no-exception" rule was modified in the unhappy
situation where the party suspected and killed was in fact innocent of
having committed the felony. In such situation, the rights of the pri-
vate person, who could arrest upon reasonable suspicion if a felony
had occurred, were decreased. His privilege of using deadly force to
effect the arrest existed only if the person arrested had actually com-
mitted a felony.22 However, the rights of the officer to use deadly force
in effecting the arrest were the same as his rights to make the arrest;
14. Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REv.
566, 568 (1936).
15. Id. at 569.
16. Id. at 570. Contra, PERKINS, supra note 11, at 874 n.7.
17. Hall, supra note 14, at 570-75.
18. Id. at 575.
19. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 272 (1940).
20. Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 117 A. 211 (1922).
21. See note 19, supra.
22. Perkins, supra note 19, at 273.
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he had to be acting on the reasonable suspicion of a felony having been
committed by the arrestee. 23 There are two reasons for the more liberal
rule for officers: (1) They have more expertise on the subject of
felonies so they will be inclined to make fewer mistakes; and (2) the
officer has a duty to make the arrest. 24
Thus the common law came to allow the officer to make both mis-
takes in effecting an arrest, with or without the use of deadly force,
while the private person was permitted only the second mistake as an
arresting party, and if he used deadly force neither mistake was toler-
ated.
In Pennsylvania there is a poverty of case law on the use of deadly
force to stop a fleeing felon by either private person or police officer.
The Brooks case restricted the right to kill a felon by stating that "upon
suspicion of felony only he [a private person] cannot . ..kill the
suspected person. ' '25 However, the meaning of this dicta is unclear. It
would appear obvious that the court did not desire to permit the first
mistake, since that error was not allowed a private person when he
made an arrest without deadly force. It is not clear, however, whether
the court intended to exclude the second mistake also. Such an inter-
pretation as this would be in line with the common law rule.
Whatever Brooks did mean, dicta in Long established that the private
person was entitled to neither mistake,26 however, it did not state what
the situation would be when an officer erred. From Long it could be
inferred that an officer was entitled to make a mistake, but it remained
unclear which mistake could be made. Dean Trickett's work also failed
to indicate what liability, if any, would attach to an arresting party
making a reasonable mistake of fact. 27
Thus the question as to what mistake or mistakes a peace officer can
make when he uses deadly force to effectuate an arrest was undecided
when Duerr2s came before the Superior Court. Duerr answered that
23. Id.
24. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 134 (1964).
25. 61 Pa. at 358, where the court in dicta also stated that the law of arrests followed
in Pennsylvania is the same as the common law rule.
26. "When a party may be lawfully arrested for felony, and he knowing the cause,
flees, so that he cannot be taken otherwise than by killing him, the constable pursuing
him will be justified in killing him; or a private person will, in like manner, be justified,
if he can prove that the deceased was actually guilty of a felony. 17 Pa. Super. at
648.
27. TRICKETr, supra note 2, at 677, 683-84.
28. 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946). ..
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question, and established the rule in Pennsylvania. The Duerr case is
therefore worthy of examination since the Supreme Court in Cherman-
sky appeared to affirm it without question or discussion.
Duerr was a police officer who was convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter after he shot two innocent men thinking they were fleeing
felons.29 While acting on a tip given by a person previously arrested
for larceny of an automobile, Duerr was stationed at an alleged rendez-
vous point with other officers where they were waiting for the felon's
two accomplices. At about the appointed time for the rendezvous two
men arrived and stopped their car, and as the police moved in to make
an arrest, the men fled. They were chased to the inside of a building,
where Duerr shot and killed both. The trial court charged that an
officer is not privileged to use deadly force unless a felony has actually
been committed by the deceased, and this was excepted to. On appeal,
the Superior Court cited no Pennsylvania law to support the lower
court's charge. The court did cite secondary authorities, but they
seemed to stand for the proposition that deadly force may be used to
effectuate an arrest only if a felony has in fact been committed.3 0 The
extra-state cases cited in Duerr also seemed to stand for that same
proposition. 31 Among the authorities relied upon was the Restatement
of Torts.32 After referring to secondary and out-of-state authorities
which were not on point, the court finally turned to the issue of
whether an officer, knowing that a felony has been committed, is jus-
tified in using deadly force to arrest a person whom he reasonably
suspects of having committed the felony, provided the use of such force
is necessary to effectuate the arrest? The court answered that question
in four sentences:
[1] The appellant strongly asserts that authorities to which we
have referred are not applicable as he [the officer] knew a felony
in the form of larceny of certain automobiles had been committed,
so that he brought himself within the rule that where a felony
has been committed the killing by an officer of one who has at-
tempted to flee arrest, is justified homicide. [2] The fallacy of that
29. 158 Pa. Super. at 486, 45 A.2d at 236.
30. Id. at 492-93, 45 A.2d at 239.
31. Id.
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131 (1934), provides:
The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the other
by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged, if (a) the arrest is made for
treason or a felony which normally causes or threatens death or serious bodily harm,
or which involves the breaking and entry of a dwelling place, and (b) the actor




argument is quite apparent. [3] The felony in question must have
been committed by the person whom the officer is presently seek-
ing to arrest. [4] Otherwise, if a felony has been committed in the
community an officer could shoot and kill an entirely innocent
person, whom he might suspect of being a felon as in this case.
33
These four sentences constituted the Duerr court's entire analysis of
the problem. The sentences are interesting examples of judicial crafts-
manship. The first sentence stated the defendant's contention, which
was a restricted version of the applicable common law rule. The sec-
ond sentence added nothing. The third merely stated as a conclusion
that rule which the court was seeking to decide, and the last sentence
stated only the effect of the rule. What the court did was to establish
by secondary and out-of-state authorities that the first mistake was not
permitted, and then without any analysis, excluded the second mistake.
In addition, it seems that one of the Duerr court's authorities, upon
analysis, was contra to the final decision and would permit the second
mistake. In referring to the Restatement of Torts, the court quoted
the applicable section 3 4 but apparently ignored the comments, illustra-
tions and references to other sections. A comment to section 131 pro-
vides:
This Section states the rule which determines the existence of a
privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death for the
purpose of effecting any arrest which is privileged. It applies as
fully to an arrest made without a warrant by a private person or a
peace officer as to an arrest made under a warrant. (Emphasis
added.)35
As to what arrests are allowed, section 121(b) of the Restatement indi-
cates that the privilege extends to peace officers:
although no act or omission constituting a felony has been com-
mitted, [when] the officer reasonably suspects that such an act or
omission has been committed and that the other has committed
it.... (Emphasis added.)36
Thus the Restatement of Torts permits the police officer to make both
mistakes. Therefore it seems that this authority which was cited by
the Duerr court to support its position was clearly contra to the hold-
33. 158 Pa. Super. at 493, 45 A.2d at 239.
34. See note 32, supra.
35. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131, comment c (1934).
36. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 121(b) (1934).
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ing. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, issued subsequent to Duerr,
also provides that deadly force may be used when necessary if the
arresting party "reasonably believes" that the suspect has committed a
felony, which had to have occurred. 37 The Restatement (Second) and
its predecessor use an example for section 131 that is similar, except
that in the later version the arresting officer shoots an innocent person
he reasonably suspects after a felony was in fact committed, while in
the original Restatement the officer only reasonably suspects that a
felony was committed.88
Because Chermansky deals with a private person, unlike Duerr which
involved a police officer, the Supreme Court could later limit its ap-
proval of the earlier case to the facts of Chermansky. Thus, the Su-
preme Court has yet to hold that a police officer is not entitled to
either mistake.
The rule of Duerr would be specifically overruled with the passage
of the Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania, which provides that
"this section [307] is intended to overrule Commonwealth v. Duerr,
* . .and to establish rational guidelines to govern use of force in law
enforcement. ' 3 9
The proposed act first provides that force-deadly or non-deadly-
may only be used if "the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary to effect a lawful arrest. ' ' 40 Non-deadly force would be per-
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 (1965).
38. Illustration 4 in the original Restatement and illustration 2 in Restatement (Sec-
ond) provide that "A is privileged to shoot B if the arrest cannot otherwise be ef-
fected .. " The facts in the original Restatement provide that "A, an officer in uni-
form, attempts to arrest B for the murder of C, reasonably suspecting that C has been
murdered and that B has murdered him." The facts in Restatement (Second) state that
"A, an officer in uniform, attempts to arrest B for the murder of C, reasonably suspecting
that B is the murderer. C has been murdered."
39. PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 307, comment at 62 (1967).
40. PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 307 (1967), provides that:
(a) Subject to the provisions of this section and section 309, [which precludes justi-
fication when the actor has made a mistake of law or has acted recklessly or negli-
gently] the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the
actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest. (b) Limitations ... (1) The
use of force is not justifiable under this section unless (i) the actor makes known
the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is otherwise known by or cannot reason-
ably be made known to the person to be arrested; and (ii) when the arrest is made
under a warrant, the warrant is valid or believed by the actor to be valid. (2) The
use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless: (i) the arrest is for a
felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer
or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer;
and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates no substantial risk of
injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (a) the crime for which
the arrest is made involved conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly
force; or (b) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death
or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is delayed.
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mitted if the actor makes known the purpose of his arrest (if that is
possible) while acting under a warrant believed to be valid. Deadly
force, however, is only-permitted when a peace officer is arresting for
a felony while believing that the crime committed involved the use or
threatened use of deadly force, or when there is a "substantial risk
that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury
,if his apprehension is delayed."4' 1 Such deadly force, however, would
not be permitted should the arresting officer believe that its use would
create a substantial risk of injury to an innocent person.42
The proposed code would seemingly change the existing law of
arrest in three ways. Arrests using deadly force could no longer be
effected by anyone for non-dangerous felonies; a police officer would
no longer be strictly liable if he reasonably erred in killing an innocent
person; and the private person would no longer be entitled to use
deadly force to effect any arrest.
It should be noted that the proposed Pennsylvania code is nearly
identical to the Model Penal Code,43 and that code's comments should
serve as a guide for interpretation of the proposed code.
The argument for limiting the use of deadly force to situations
involving dangerous felonies is quite simple and was used by the
Supreme Court in Chermansky. Today it could be argued that it is
illogical to allow a felon who may never draw a death sentence and
has not endangered human life to be taken by deadly force. 44 The
common law reason for the rule-that felons were killed anyway-
has been abolished.
In addition, by the proposed code an existing anomalous situation
would be removed. As explained in the Model Penal Code,45 the com-
mon law rules for the use of deadly force in arrests are broader than
those which evolved to justify the use of such force to prevent felonies.
Thus, deadly force may be used only to prevent a dangerous felony,
while any fleeing felon, whether the act committed was dangerous or
not, could be justifiably killed.
When strict liability is applied to police officers who kill an in-
41. Id. at § 307(b)(2)(iv).
42. Id. at § 307(b)(2)(iii).
43. There are minor variations between the two comparable provisos of § 307 of the
PROPOSED CRIMES CODE and § 3.07 of the MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
They are not relevant here.
44. During 1968 there were no executions carried out in the United States. 92 TIM,,
Jan. 10, 1969, at 38.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment at 57 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958)..
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nocent person reasonably believed to be a felon an unjust situation
is believed to exist. The police officer with a sworn duty to arrest is
bound to make a difficult decision in a matter of seconds, and to be
correct every time. The Model Penal Code calls such strict liability
the "very worst way" of limiting the common law privilege for the
use of deadly force,46 and as mentioned here, the proposed state code
is also critical of such liability.47
Both the proposed code48 and the Model Penal Code49 do remove
the defense of justification if a police officer is reckless or negligent in
his actions.
The decision of the drafters of the proposed state code to exclude
private citizens from those privileged to use deadly force to arrest
felons in all instances can be criticized. The rule comes from the
Model Penal Code, where it is stated that "[i]t has seemed important
in an age of firearms to restrict the use of deadly force to official per-
sonnel .... ,,50 But the drafters were not too heavily in favor of the
limitation. The Code reports that the feasibility of such a rule was
questioned, except for "well policed urban areas." The Council of the
Institute, however, voted 16 to 6 to preserve the limitation.51 The state
of Pennsylvania is far from being a "well policed urban area" and it
is submitted that before such a limitation is imposed it should be care-
fully considered. The ramifications of such a rule would seem unjust.
For example, a Pennsylvania resident unable to effect an arrest in any
other manner could be indicted for killing the fleeing man who had
just violently assaulted and raped his wife.
A question arises under the proposed state code as to which error
would be permitted for officers attempting an arrest while using
deadly force. Obviously, if the proposed code is aimed at allowing the
officer to make a reasonable mistake of fact and use deadly force
against innocent persons, the second and most common error would
seem to be permitted. However, as to the first mistake, the proposed
code gives no indication whether it would be allowed,52 it calls only
for overruling Duerr and establishing "rational guidelines."5 3 The
46. Id.
47. PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 307, Comment at 62 (1967).
48. Id. at § 309(b) (1967).
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
50. Id. at § 3.07, Comment at 58.
51. See n.5, at 58 of the MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
52. PROPOSED CRIMES CODE FOR PENNSYLVANIA § 307, Comment at 62-63 (1967).
53. Id. at 62.
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Model Penal Code, however, appears to allow both mistakes. As a
limitation to only the second mistake, it provides; "also creates the
possibility of absolute liability. 54
It is submitted that the proposed code represents long overdue
progress; Duerr has been the law for too long. However, query
whether the policy of excluding such privilege from private citizens
under all circumstances is wise.
It is also submitted that the primary holding of Chermansky, which
limits private arresting parties who use deadly force to situations in-
volving the enumerated dangerous felonies, was dicta. This conclusion
is based upon the fact that the jury could have found that the victim
in Chermansky was a common law burglar. 55 Nevertheless, there is no
reason to believe that the dicta would not be followed by the court in
a later case, and with wide ramifications. For instance, since the court
specifically stated that only a common law burglary" is an applicable
felony, a citizen would be unable to use deadly force to arrest a felon
fleeing from any daytime (and therefore statutory) burglary 7 of his
home. In addition, a businessman would be unable to use such force
to stop a fleeing burglar, whether it be daytime or night. A hypothetical
fact situation can be used to illustrate the possible effects of the Cher-
mansky rule. A person walks into a bank, reaches over a counter, grabs
a handfull of money and runs. The bank manager, who is not knowl-
edgeable in the law, pursues the person who is a possible statutory
burglar. Unable to otherwise make the arrest, the manager shoots and
kills the running person. Under Chermansky the manager could be
indicted for homicide.
In addition, it is submitted that the instant case opens the door for
a similar holding in respect to police. How would peace officers be
distinguished from private persons? Generally, the policeman's privi-
lege to use deadly force is broader because the officer is better qualified
to determine if a particular act is a crime, and because he has a sworn
duty to arrest. It would appear, however, that neither of these factors
would be a proper basis for allowing the police officer to use deadly
force against all felons, while the citizen is limited to certain dangerous
ones. What relation does the officer's diagnostic judgment have to the
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, Comment at 57 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
55. Brief for Appellant at 8b, Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d
237 (1968).
56. "Common-law burglary is the nocturnal breaking into the dwelling house of an-
other with intent to commit a felony." (Emphasis added). PERKINS, supra note 11, at 149.
57. See note 8, supra.
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policy question of whether deadly force should be allowed against
those who commit statutory burglary and larceny and other non-
dangerous felonies? If this logical extension of Chermansky were to
be made, it would put Pennsylvania peace officers in a position where
they could use deadly force to arrest only for certain enumerated
dangerous felonies, and if they made any mistake in judgment, they
would be criminally liable.
The Chermansky rule, especially with its possible extension to
police officers, also has practical ramifications insofar as it would limit
police in their use of force during civil disturbances. As the rule now
stands, private citizens cannot use deadly force to arrest looters, who
are statutory burglars (unless they happen to be looting a house at
night). If Chermansky were extended, police officers would be
similarly restricted. Thus, following such an extension, mayors of
large cities would be in a position where they would not have to make
any decision as to whether deadly force should be used to arrest looters.
Judicial decision would dictate that none should be used.
In summary it is submitted that the court's use of Duerr to hold a
private citizen criminally liable for the mistaken use of deadly force
was not prudent. In so doing, the court approved for 'the first time
the Duerr rule, but without benefit or arguments on the merits of the
Superior Court holding. In Chermansky there were no specific ques-
tions of law appealed,58 and the fact situation of the case did not re-
quire a rule as strong as Duerr. Instead, the court could have relied
on dicta from Long,59 or pointed out that its affirmation of Duerr was
limited to the facts of Chermansky. By so doing, the poorly rationalized
holding of Duerr would have lost some of its import and the way
would have been paved for a more realistic rule to cover this important
area. Instead, the court breathed new life into the often criticized rule.
David J. Brightbill
58. The questions appealed were: Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence?
Do the interests of justice require a new trial? Brief for Appellant at 2, Commonwealth
v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968).
59. See note 26, supra and accompanying text.
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